Abstract-Consensus mechanisms used by popular distributed ledgers are highly scalable but notoriously inefficient. Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocols are efficient but far less scalable. Speculative BFT protocols such as Zyzzyva and Zyzzyva5 are efficient and scalable but require a trade-off: Zyzzyva requires only 3f + 1 replicas to tolerate f faults, but even a single slow replica will make Zyzzyva fall back to more expensive non-speculative operation. Zyzzyva5 does not require a nonspeculative fallback, but requires 5f + 1 replicas in order to tolerate f faults. BFT variants using hardware-assisted trusted components can tolerate a greater proportion of faults, but require that every replica have this hardware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed ledger technology [6] , [9] , [24] and cryptocurrencies [10] , [39] have become the great motivators for distributed consensus protocols today. These applications demand scalability and performance over high-latency networks such as the Internet. Current approaches range from proof-ofwork [10] , [39] to Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) [7] , [11] , [22] , [31] , [35] , [36] , [40] .
Both approaches have significant drawbacks. Proof of work derives its Sybil-resistance from the magnitude of its power consumption [9] . Furthermore, its scalability comes at the cost of eschewing transaction finality [47] , [48] . Conversely, BFT protocols [31] are computationally efficient, but scale poorly. As traditionally formulated, these require two phases [30] and a quadratic number of messages [17] . However, a wide variety of improvements can be obtained over classical results [11] by varying cryptographic [43] , failure-mode [33] , [40] , timing [15] , [38] , and safety [29] assumptions.
Zyzzyva [5] , [29] is the simplest and most compelling of the BFT protocols. It takes a speculative approach that optimizes for the common case where no replicas are faulty. MinZyzzyva [40] improves on Zyzzyva by assuming that each replica contains a trusted monotonic counter, whose integrity is guaranteed by hardware. In particular, it reduces the total number of replicas needed to tolerate f faults from 3f + 1 to 2f + 1. This assumption, that every replica is equipped with a trusted component, is often unrealistic. In the real world, only some devices will have the necessary hardware, especially when new hardware is being rolled out. Even if eventually all replicas have the necessary hardware support, over time some hardware platforms will become obsolete either because have become outdated in comparison to newly-released hardware, or because trust in them has been revoked in response to some vulnerability. Protocols that require trusted components in every participant are thus fragile.
Speculative BFT protocols have extremely simple and efficient speculative execution paths when there are no faults or delays. In the event of a fault, Zyzzyva and MinZyzzyva have the client execute a non-speculative fallback sacrificing performance. This results in a major drawback: if even a single replica fails to respond to the client, the protocols immediately fall back to non-speculative execution, unlike non-speculative protocols which concern themselves mainly with faulty primaries [14] . Realistic communication networks like the Internet are only partially synchronous. In such networks, a single slow-not necessarily faulty-replica can trigger the non-speculative execution for each protocol run, thereby undermining the efficiency promise of the speculative approach. Speculative variants like Zyzzyva5 [29] minimize the need for non-speculative fallback, but have lower faulttolerance, requiring 5f + 1 replicas to tolerate f faults.
In this paper, we present Single Active Counter Zyzzyva (SACZyzzyva), which overcomes these drawbacks. It requires only a single replica, the primary, to have an active monotonic counter, and eliminates the need for a non-speculative fallback (as in Zyzzyva5), thus allowing SACZyzzyva to tolerate a subset of replicas being slow, while requiring only 3f + 1 replicas (as in Zyzzyva). We compare SACZyzzyva to other speculative BFT protocols in Table I . The same principles that we use in SACZyzzyva can be applied in other settings: other BFT protocols can be adapted to use our single active counter approach, resulting in lower latency while avoiding the need to equip all replicas with hardware-supported monotonic counters.
The cost of supporting this heterogeneity-of not requiring that all replicas have trusted components-is the need for more replicas to tolerate the same number of faults f : 3f + 1 in SACZyzzyva, compared to 2f + 1 in MinZyzzyva. We show that SACZyzzyva is optimally fault tolerant. Specifically, it is not possible to tolerate more than (n − 1)/3 failures-as SACZyzzyva does-unless more than two thirds of parties have access to a trusted component (as MinZyzzyva does).
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We propose SACZyzzyva (Section IV), a Zyzzyva variant that tolerates (n − 1)/3 faults and uses a trusted monotonic counter to eliminate the need for a non-speculative fallback, making it more robust to slow replicas.
• We implement and evaluate SACZyzzyva over both lowand high-latency networks (Section V), showing that SACZyzzyva transaction latencies increase at a rate of less than 40 μs per additional replica.
• We show that the use of trusted components in a consensus protocol cannot increase fault-tolerance unless more than two thirds of parties have a trusted component (Section VI).
II. PRELIMINARIES A. Zyzzyva
Zyzzyva [29] is an efficient Byzantine-fault-tolerant statemachine replication protocol which uses speculation to reduce the replication overhead, at the cost of requiring rollback in some instances. The replicas receive requests ordered by the primary, and immediately reply to clients without running an expensive consensus protocol. Based on the received replies, clients are able to detect inconsistencies and can help the replicas achieve a consistent state. In fault-free executions with network delays that do not trigger protocol timeouts, no further action is required by clients, thereby making the protocol simple and fast.
The protocol works as follows: The client sends a request to the primary, which in turn proposes an order and forwards it to the other replicas. The replicas speculate that the primary's proposal is consistent and reply to the client. If the client receives matching replies from all replicas, then speculative execution is successful and the request is guaranteed persistent. However, if after some timeout T client the client receives between 2f + 1 and 3f matching replies, the client executes a non-speculative fallback: it broadcasts the responses that it has received to all replicas, and waits for 2f +1 acknowledgements. The replicas acknowledge the commit certificate if it is consistent with the local history of ordered requests. This non-speculative fallback allows for operation in the presence of faults, but comes with significant latency costs.
Finally, if acknowledgements are not received, the client broadcasts the request to all replicas, who communicate with the primary to assign a sequence number and execute it.
Zyzzyva is efficient and scalable, but this efficiency comes at a price, in the form of fragility. If even a single replica is faulty, or network conditions cause a single message to be delayed beyond the timeouts, speculative execution fails and the client must execute its non-speculative fallback, requiring at least two additional rounds of communication, in addition to the time spent waiting for the timeout. This negates Zyzzyva's main contribution-its high performanceespecially over the internet where Zyzzyva's small communication footprint would otherwise be most useful.
A variant, Zyzzyva5 [29, Section 4.1], was introduced along with Zyzzyva, which avoided this non-speculative fallback at the cost of fault-tolerance by increasing the number of replicas from 3f +1 to 5f +1, and allowing requests to complete after 4f + 1 responses. With these thresholds, all requests complete speculatively, but at the cost of Zyzzyva5 only tolerating (n− 1)/5 faults in comparison to Zyzzyva's (n − 1)/3 .
B. Hybridization and trusted components
Another way to improve on classical BFT results is to use hybridization [46] , in which replicas contain several components of different failure modes. Under this model, failed replicas cannot behave completely arbitrarily; instead, they are limited by their non-Byzantine components.
A common approach is to design the replicas around a trusted component, whose output can be authenticated by other parties and is subject only to crash-failures. This can be achieved with the aid of the hardware-assisted trusted execution environments (TEEs) that exist in many modern CPUs.
TEEs protect the execution of a security-critical piece of application from potentially-compromised applications, system administrators and the operating system itself. By the process of remote attestation, they can securely communicate the existence of such trusted components to an external verifier, allowing other parties to rely on the security guarantees provided by the hardware. Examples of such hardware mechanisms are Intel SGX [25] and ARM TrustZone [2] .
TEEs are highly general; in concrete protocols, we generally do not consider their full functionality, but instead use them to implement more limited trusted functionality that can be effectively reasoned about. An especially popular such functionality is the trusted monotonic counter.
A trusted monotonic counter uses these hardware security features to realize a verifiably monotonically increasing counter.
Let M X indicate that a message M has been signed by some entity X. A trusted monotonic counter component TC is assumed to have a well-known public key-for example, established with remote attestation-and provide the following interface: [40] to prevent message equivocation. A trusted monotonic counter value can be attached to a message in order to detect whether the sender communicated the same data to all recipients. If the sender equivocates, different messages will have different counter values, this being detectable as a 'hole' in the set of counter values [32] , [37] , [40] , [42] . Persistent hardware-backed versions of such counters are available within TPMs [20] and the Intel SGX [25] platform; alternatively, a TEE can be used to implement a memory-backed monotonic counters that offers high performance at the cost of ephemerality or replication [37] .
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Network Model
In this paper we consider the weak-synchrony model [11] , [38] . Messages and computation can be arbitrarily delayed, but the delay delay(t) of a message sent at time t cannot grow faster than the timeout period-which may vary adaptivelyindefinitely.
This model permits polynomially-increasing delays when exponential backoff is used to increase message timeouts [38, §3.1]. However, it does not allow an adversary to continually delay messages so that they arrive after the exponentially-increasing timeouts, thereby achieving eventual synchrony [29] . This model enables us to analyze liveness during a period of synchrony that will eventually occur. This also avoids the well-known FLP impossibility result [19] , which showed that it is not possible to achieve consensus in a fully asynchronous system [34] .
B. System Model
We consider a distributed system of n replicas, of which up to f may be faulty. We suppose that some, but not all, replicas are equipped with a trusted component and, in particular, with a trusted monotonic counter. The result is that b out of n replicas can, if faulty, behave completely arbitrarily, whereas the other n − b replicas, if they fail, are assumed to be limited in their behavior by the trusted component.
C. Problem Statement
Our goal is to build an efficient state-machine replication protocol that allows the replicas to complete a request
• in a linear (in n) number of messages, and • without significant performance reductions in the event of up to f faults. We borrow from Zyzzyva [29] the properties that our BFT protocol must satisfy to be correct. The first one is safety: suppose that from the perspective of some client, a request completes with a response indicating a history H-a sequence of ordered and completed requests-then the history of any other completed request as seen by any other client is a prefix of H, or vice-versa. Hence, from the perspective of the client, the state machine history never diverges, even if that of individual replicas might. The second one is liveness: any request issued by a correct client eventually completes.
IV. SACZYZZYVA
In the original Zyzzyva with 3f + 1 replicas, a request is included in a new view only when it appears in f + 1 out of 2f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages. Since up to f of these VIEW-CHANGE messages may be from faulty replicas, this means that every correct replica must execute the request in order to guarantee that a speculatively-executed request will be included in the history of future views.
The MinZyzzyva [40] protocol uses a trusted monotonic counter in each replica to order requests and prevent equivocation. In doing so, it reduces to 2f +1 the number of replicas needed to tolerate f faults, but does not change the protocol in a fundamental way. However, the MinZyzzyva view-change protocol differs from that of Zyzzyva, with the initial state of a view being determined as in MinBFT [40, p. 8] : a request is included in the history of a new view when it appears in any VIEW-CHANGE message. This means that MinZyzzyva needs only one copy of a request to appear in any set of f + 1 view-change messages in order to guarantee that speculativelyexecuted requests are not lost. By modifying Zyzzyva to order requests within a view using a trusted monotonic counter in the primary, we can use the same inclusion criteria during view-changes as in the MinBFT protocols, allowing requests to safely complete after only 2f + 1 responses, eliminating the need for a non-speculative fallback. We dub this protocol Single Active Counter Zyzzyva (SACZyzzyva).
The basic principle of SACZyzzyva is to use a trusted monotonic counter in the primary to bind a sequence of consecutive counter values to incoming requests, ordering requests while avoiding the need for communication between replicas, whether directly or via the client. It does this by signing a tuple consisting of the cryptographic hash of the request and a fresh (i.e. has not been used before) counter value. This is then sent to all replicas in an ORDER-REQUEST message. Because the primary is the only replica that actively maintains a counter, we call this counter the "Single Active Counter" (SAC) construct. We therefore require only that f +1 replicas have a trusted component, enough that there will always be at least one correct replica that can function as primary. Figure 1 shows the communication pattern of SACZyzzyva. As in the original Zyzzyva, the primary gathers the requests from clients and sends them to all replicas in a ORDER-REQUEST message. The main difference is that the ORDER-REQUEST message is bound to a monotonic counter value to prevent equivocation by the primary. All replicas execute the requests and reply to the client directly if the trusted monotonic counter value is sequential to those that the primary has previously sent. If the client receives 2f + 1 replies with matching values and histories, it considers the request complete. Otherwise, it repeatedly sends the requests directly to the replicas, so that they can detect misbehavior by the primary and so elect a new one. The protocol is described below in greater detail. The basic steps are shown in boxes below; further explanation and specifics appear beneath each step. We assume that there is some well-known mapping from view-numbers to primary replicas. One such mapping is p v = v mod n TMC , where the replicas are numbered such that the first n TMC > f replicas possess a trusted monotonic counter. For simplicity of the protocol description, when a replica broadcasts a message to all replicas, this includes itself.
The correct replicas are assumed to know each others' identities and primary keys when the system is initialized, as well as the public key of the first primary's monotonic counter instance.
A. Agreement protocol
Requests are initiated similarly to the original Zyzzyva. However, unlike with Zyzzyva, only 2f + 1 replies are needed before an operation is accepted as complete. After receiving a request from the client, the primary binds a counter value to the request and then sends it to the replicas for execution, who reply directly to the client.
C-1. The client sends a request to the primary.
Explanation: Since all requests must pass through the primary in order to be executed, the client can initially send the request to the primary only. Details: The client sends a message m request = REQUEST, op, addr client , id client c to the primary, where op is the requested operation, addr client is the address of the client to which the replicas must reply, and id client is a monotonically increasing identifier used to identify whether a request has already been executed.
R-1. Upon receiving a valid REQUEST message, the primary binds the request to a counter value and then broadcasts it to all replicas as an ORDER-REQUEST message.
Explanation: Note that the primary only needs to act on valid requests; a request might be invalid if it is not syntactically correct, but there may be other cases, such as if the statemachine being replicated includes client authentication or replay protection functionality. Details: After receiving a request m request = REQUEST, op, addr client , id client c , the primary verifies that m request is valid and then binds a request number to it, using its trusted monotonic counter to obtain an 'ordering certificate'
which it includes in the ORDER-REQUEST message
that is broadcast to all replicas.
R-2. Upon receiving an ORDER-REQUEST message for the current view with a counter value greater than that of the last executed request, each replica executes the request contained in the message and responds directly to the client, obtaining any previous requests needed by sending FILL-HOLE messages to the primary. Explanation: Since not every replica is guaranteed to see every request, they need some way to "catch up" when there is a hole in their execution history. Correct replicas are guaranteed to receive a response from a correct primary during periods of synchrony, as the sender will only send this message after receiving an ORDER-REQUEST message for a later message in the same view, and so the necessary ORDER-REQUEST message will always be in the history.
Explanation
C-2a. The client waits for 2f + 1 matching replies from distinct replicas; it then accepts the response contained in these replies.
Explanation: During periods of synchrony, when the primary is correct and at least 2f + 1 replicas are correct overall, the client will receive sufficient reply messages to accept a response. This is in contrast to Zyzzyva, which can only accept at this point only after receiving responses from all 3f + 1 replicas, thus necessitating additional steps as a fallback. C-2b. After each time interval Tclient that the client has not received 2f + 1 matching replies from distinct replicas, the client broadcasts the request to all replicas.
Explanation: If the client does not receive a timely quorum of responses, then it is possible that the replicas did not all receive the request from the primary. In this case, the client sends the request to the replicas directly, so that they can determine whether the primary is willing to order the request, and initiate a view-change if not.
Details:
The client broadcasts to all replicas the message m request , previously sent to the primary in step C-1.
R-3. Upon receiving a REQUEST message whose id client is greater than the last cached identifier for that client, a replica will send it to the primary, and then wait for time T to receive a ORDER-REQUEST message that will be processed as in step R-2, otherwise requesting a view-change and broadcasting the request to all replicas.
Explanation: Routing requests through the primary makes it into a single-point-of-failure. In order to prevent the primary from dropping requests-and thus violating liveness-the client rebroadcasts its request to the replicas so that they can submit the request on the client's behalf, giving the replicas the opportunity to observe the primary's misbehavior firsthand and then trigger a view-change. As a side-effect, this also allows request processing to continue when the client does not know the current primary.
Details: In addition to the above, a replica receiving a REQUEST from another replica responds with the corresponding ORDER-REQUEST if it has it.
B. View-change protocol
In the Zyzzyva protocol, a request is included in the history of a new view if and only if there are f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages available containing the request. As there might be only f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages from correct replicas, to be certain that a request will be included in any new view, the client therefore needs to ensure that every correct replica has responded. In the SACZyzzyva view-change protocol, the canonical ordering provided by the trusted monotonic counter allows us to safely include requests whose ordering exists in even a single VIEW-CHANGE message. The client therefore needs only 2f + 1 replies in order to be certain that a request will persist across the next view-change.
VC-1. When a replica requests a view-change, it broadcasts a REQ-VIEW-CHANGE message to all other replicas and increases its timeout T in some implementation-defined way.
Explanation: This part of the view-change protocol remains unchanged from Zyzzyva. Details: The replica that has witnessed misbehavior of the primary of view v broadcasts a message REQ-VIEW-CHANGE, v i to all replicas.
VC-2. Upon receiving f + 1 REQ-VIEW-CHANGE messages for the current view v, a replica stops processing requests in the current view and broadcasts a VIEW-CHANGE message to all replicas. If the view-change does not complete within time T , the replica requests a new view-change.
Explanation: Since there is no prima-facie evidence of misbehavior by the primary, before committing to a view-change each replica waits until misbehavior has been reported by at least f + 1 replicas, so that it can prove to others with its VIEW-CHANGE message that at least one report is genuine. Details:
More specifically, replica i sets its current view-number to v + 1 and broadcasts a message VIEW-CHANGE, v + 1, i, V, R, {r i } i , where v + 1 is the new view-number, V is the most recent view or checkpoint certificate, {r i } is the set of requests that it has executed in view v, and R is a set of f + 1 REQ-VIEW-CHANGE messages requests for view v.
VC-3. Upon receiving 2f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages for a new view v, the primary for v instantiates a trusted monotonic counter instance and broadcasts a NEW-VIEW message to the replicas.
Explanation: With 2f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages, any request that has been accepted by a correct client in the last view must be present in at least one of them. This means that the primary can now safely propose a new view. Rather than directly including the view's initial state, the VC-5. Upon receiving 2f + 1 matching VIEW-CONFIRM messages from distinct replicas confirming the NEW-VIEW message from step VC-4, the view-change completes, and each replica begins to process requests in the new view.
Explanation: After receiving 2f +1 matching VIEW-CONFIRM messages, a correct replica can be certain that no other correct replica will process requests in this view with a different starting state. Details: Consistency in this case means that all 2f + 1 messages have identical view-numbers v and NEW-VIEW hashes H(m). The starting state for this view is taken to be that of highest-numbered view with a certificate in any of the VIEW-CHANGE messages in the confirmed NEW-VIEW message, extended with the longest consecutive sequence of requests in any of the same VIEW-CHANGE messages containing this view. Putting a replica into this state may require rolling-back some previously-executed requests, and making it necessary to maintain enough information to roll back to the last checkpoint, or in extreme cases to carry out state transfer as in [11] . These 2f + 1 VIEW-CONFIRM messages are stored as a view certificate.
C. Checkpointing Protocol
Since it is possible that a view-change might require a replica to roll-back some already-executed requests in the latest view, replicas must maintain enough information to rewind their state to the last confirmed transaction. To keep the required storage from growing without bound, Zyzzyva includes a checkpoint protocol [29, Section 3.1] taken from that of PBFT [11, Section 4.3]; we do not reproduce all of the details, but sketch it here.
CP-1 (sketch). Every N requests, each replica broadcasts a CHECKPOINT message containing the current view certificate, the most recently-executed request number, and a hash of the current state to all replicas.
Explanation: Since a correct replica will include in its VIEW-CHANGE messages every request that it has executed, a CHECKPOINT message is a commitment to include all of these requests in future VIEW-CHANGE messages.
CP-2 (sketch). After receiving 2f + 1 matching CHECKPOINT messages for the current view, a replica considers the CHECK-POINT to be stable, and discards all ORDER-REQUEST messages from before the checkpoint.
Explanation: Once 2f + 1 replicas have commit to including a request in their future VIEW-CHANGE messages, then it is guaranteed that at least one correct replica from among them will have their VIEW-CHANGE message appear in any future successful view-change. The CHECKPOINT messages are stored as the latest checkpoint certificate. In this sketch we do not include e.g. low-and high-water marks; full details can be found in [11, Section 4.3] .
We include arguments for the safety and liveness of SACZyzzyva in the extended version [23] .
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To assess the performance impact of our protocols, we created an experimental setup, derived from [44] , that runs proofof-concept implementations of Zyzzyva5 and SACZyzzyva in a fault-free scenario. Note that SACZyzzyva cannot be meaningfully compared with regular Zyzzyva here, as they differ only in the presence of faults; we might induce a fault ourselves, but in this case the performance of Zyzzyva is mainly determined by the client timeout-that is, the time that the client waits before broadcasting a commit certificate when it does not receive responses from all replicas. We therefore use Zyzzyva5 as a baseline for our experiments.
The trusted monotonic counter is implemented in an Intel SGX enclave, backed by volatile memory. The counter value is stored in an SGX-protected region of normal memory, and set to zero at enclave initialization. The use of volatile memory provides high performance, and because a new counter instance is used for each view, the loss of counter state in the event of a transient fault is not catastrophic-if this happens, a view-change will occur but the protocol will continue. All protocols are implemented using the same BFT platform, and so share networking and cryptographic code.
We made our measurements using Amazon EC2 [1] running a single replica per instance, and a separate instance used by the client. Because EC2 does not support SGX, the software was compiled in simulation mode [3] . Separately, on a standalone SGX-enabled machine, we confirmed that measurements in SGX simulation mode are similar to measurements using SGX.
We report medians rather than mean and standard deviation, as the measured latencies are non-normal.
A. Performance within a single datacenter
In order to test performance on low-latency networks, we carry out measurements on a set of replicas placed within a single EC2 region, Frankfurt. The test setup consists of a cluster of 50 m4.large and m5.large EC2 instances [1] .
For each protocol, we measure the time it takes for a transaction to complete, for increasing numbers of replicas, averaged over 50 transaction attempts. These results are shown in Figure 2a . SACZyzzyva requires fewer replicas than Zyzzyva5 for a given level of faulttolerance, and therefore completes requests in less time. While the number of replicas has a significant effect on latency-on average, a marginal increase of 35μs/replica (SACZyzzyva) and 37μs/replica (Zyzzyva5)-the latency is still relatively small in an absolute sense. We will see in Section V-B that latency is dominated by network delays even with a larger number of replicas.
B. Performance across the internet
To assess the performance over high-latency networks such as the internet, we measured the performance of SACZyzzyva and Zyzzyva5 using the replicas divided between between three EC2 regions, Ohio, Frankfurt, and Sydney in order to approximate the performance of the protocols when organically deployed across the internet.
In each test region we provision EC2 instances of type m4.large and m5.large-50 in Frankfurt and Ohio, and 42 in Sydney, the maximum number available to us.
As in Section V-A, we measure the response latency at the client as a function of the number of tolerable faults. The results are shown in Figure 2b . Here latencies are dominated by speed-of-light delays, and increase linearly at rates of 25μs/replica (SACZyzzyva) and 8μs/replica (Zyzzyva5) respectively.
In this particular geographic configuration, SACZyzzyva and significantly reduce its latency by reducing the number of replies needed: Zyzzyva5 needs responses from four fifths of replicas for requests to complete, but SACZyzzyva requires only two thirds of replicas to respond. This means that SACZyzzyva does not need to wait for responses to arrive across the slow trans-Pacific link as Zyzzyva does. Another surprising effect is that the rate of latency increase per replica is less than when the protocol is run on a low-latency network. We hypothesize that this is because the large network latencies mean that only the processing time of responses from the most distant replicas affects the overall latency.
VI. OPTIMALITY IN THE HYBRID FAULT MODEL
Existing consensus protocols, to tolerate f faults, require either 2f +1 parties with a trusted component or 3f +1 of any kind, as shown in Figure 3 ; SACZyzzyva still requires 3f + 1 replicas despite the use of f + 1 trusted monotonic counters, and it is reasonable to ask whether these trusted components might allow us to obtain a similar protocol that requires some smaller number of nodes.
We show here that this is not the case; specifically, that it is impossible to achieve both safety and liveness without either 3f +1 nodes in total, or 2f +1 nodes with trusted components. This theoretical limit is shown graphically in Figure 3 .
A. Failure model
We elaborate on the system model in Section III-B by introducing some new terminology.
Partially-Byzantine failures. A party with a trusted component can be split into two parts, as shown in Figure 4 1) An untrusted part, which either behaves correctly or suffers a Byzantine failure. 2) A trusted part, which communicates via the untrusted part and either behaves correctly or suffers a crash failure. The result is that failures of a trusted-component-equipped party are partially-Byzantine: though their untrusted component can behave arbitrarily, the trusted component will follow its programming, and thus other parties can remain assured of at least some aspects of the behavior of the party.
Fully-Byzantine failures. We refer to the failures of a party without a trusted component as fully-Byzantine: there are no restrictions on the behavior such a party in the event of a failure.
Crash failures. In his failure mode, nodes simply crash. We refer to crash and partially-Byzantine failures together as non-fully-Byzantine failures.
More formally, we consider a set of parties P executing a protocol π, and let some subset B be fully-Byzantine in the event of a failure, and its complement P \B be 'non-fullyByzantine'.
We allow up to f parties to fail according to their respective failure modes: those failed parties that happen to be in in B act under the full control of an adversary, whereas those failed parties that are in P \B only give control of their untrusted parts to the adversary.
B. Impossibility result
We describe here our main result; the proof appears in the extended version [23] . Theorem 1. Let π be a consensus protocol amongst n parties in the partial synchrony model, b of which, when they fail, fail fully-Byzantine, and n − b of which, when they fail, either crash or fail partially-Byzantine. Then, to tolerate f failures, at least one of the following must be true:
Proof. The proof is given in the extended version [23] .
Briefly, we follow a quorum intersection argument. We define the concept of a quorum and prove that, for any quora Q 1 and Q 2 , their intersection Q 1 ∩ Q 2 must not fail fullyByzantine. For this to be assured, Q 1 ∩ Q 2 must contain at least one replica that cannot fail fully-Byzantine, or at least f + 1 replicas in total, implying the conditions above.
Therefore, it is impossible to outdo the usual requirement of 3f + 1 replicas without 2f + 1 parties having access to some component that cannot fail Byzantine.
VII. RELATED WORK
As SACZyzzyva is motivated by recent blockchain-based distributed systems [10] , [39] , in this section we review some research work that aims at scalability and efficiency for distributed consensus protocol involving large populations. Consensus protocols in blockchain scenarios. Fabric [6] and Sawtooth [24] are two recent examples of distributed ledgers, which support the execution of smart contracts. Both use a consensus module to coordinate multiple parties. In particular, Fabric can use a fault-tolerance protocol like such as BFTSMaRt [8] , [41] , while Sawtooth is mostly known for its Proof-of-Elapsed-Time protocol, which is vastly more scalable than BFT protocols but provides only eventual consistency. Protocols with O(n) message complexity such as SACZyzzyva and CoSi allow for high scalability, as in Sawtooth, but without sacrificing finality.
Among other BFT protocols, there are also asynchronous protocols such as Honey Badger [38] and BEAT [18] , which do not make any synchrony assumptions. However, this requires relatively expensive primitives such as reliable broadcast and threshold cryptography, and so such protocols are less efficient.
Byzcoin [28] is a hybrid Nakamoto/BFT consensus protocol that uses the Bitcoin consensus protocol to select a group of verifiers that is small enough in size to run a traditional BFT algorithm. SACZyzzyva would serve well in this role, as a replacement for the multisignature-based protocol used by [28] .
Protocols that reduce replica count. Several research works recognize the importance of tackling the equivocation problem (malicious replicas sending out different conflicting messages to different recipients) in BFT protocols, since this allows the reduction of the replica count to 2f + 1. MinBFT [15] , [40] proposes the use of a trusted monotonic counter to tag the messages, making equivocation detectable. Similarly, [4] shows how to implement a weak sequenced broadcast primitive using a TPM. SACZyzzyva's use of trusted monotonic counters is closely related to MinBFT's approach. A2M [12] provides an abstraction for attested append only memory. This is used to implement a hardware-based secure log for outgoing messages; while incoming messages are accepted only after the verification of a log attestation. CheapBFT [26] and ReBFT [16] provide a way to reduce further the number of replicas by making f of them passive, and activating them only when it is required to handle faults and make progress. SACZyzzyva puts a bridge between the world where all replicas have a trusted component and the world where only some of them have it, ultimately showing a protocol for the heterogeneous setting.
Protocols with low communication complexity. Several protocols have been proposed to reduce the message count. Zyzzyva [29] and variants [21] avoid all-to-all broadcasts by using speculative execution. Chain replication [45] has a low message complexity since replicas are organized on a chainlike communication topology and only use broadcasts in the case of faults. Byzcoin [28] similarly uses a tree-like communication topology, and uses collective signing to aggregate messages from multiple nodes. FastBFT [33] improves on that approach by means of a lightweight TEE-based message aggregation technique. SACZyzzyva belongs to the former category, using speculative execution to reduce the number of messages, but without needing to make the trade-off between fault-tolerance and robust performance as with Zyzzyva.
Lower bounds. BFT protocols suffer from several fundamental limitations. First, it has been shown [30] that asynchrnous protocols require two phases to terminate. Speculative protocols like Zyzzyva or SACZyzzyva are able to terminate in one phase since they make additional assumption (namely, that rollback is possible). Second, BFT protocols typically require a quadratic number of messages to terminate [17] . The workaround for many protocols is to use cryptographic constructions which can err with positive probability [27] . Finally, in [13] it has been shown that achieving non-equivocation is actually insufficient for reducing the number of replicas, and that transferable authentication of messages (e.g., using digital signatures) is additionally necessary. In SACZyzzyva the trusted monotonic counter ensures non-equivocation, with an attestation that is publicly verifiable (and so transferable) with the aid of digital certificates from the hardware manufacturer.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
By incorporating a trusted monotonic counter into Zyzzyva's ordering process, we can eliminate its nonspeculative fallback without sacrificing fault-tolerance as previous solutions have. This removes one of the main disadvantages of the Zyzzyva family of protocols, namely that without sacrificing fault-tolerance they are unable to perform speculative execution in the presence of even a single fault.
SACZyzzyva achieves the resilience of Zyzzyva5 while reducing the replica count from 5f +1 to 3f +1. MinZyzzyva uses trusted monotonic counters in every replica, and so in principle we might expect that MinZyzzyva's non-speculative fallback can be similarly eliminated. This is not entirely straightforward, as we need to ensure that even a faulty replica will disclose the requests that it has seen. We will address this topic later in an extended version of this paper.
Our approach does not only apply to Zyzzyva-like protocols. For example, PBFT uses an all-to-all broadcast to provide a canonical ordering of requests; when a trusted monotonic counter is available, this step can be eliminated, as in MinBFT [40, Figure 1 ], but without requiring a trusted monotonic counter in every replica [44] .
We have also shown that more than two-thirds of replicas must have a trusted component in order to tolerate more than (n − 1)/3 faults. This means that our protocols achieve optimal fault-tolerance, but shows that there is an important part of the design space that remains unexplored.
